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INTRODUCTION
Forty years is a relatively short time in judging the maturity of
a legal concept. Prior to the passage of the New York Arbitration
Act1 in 1920, and the United States Arbitration Act2 in 1925, the idea
of settling disputes by arbitration was deemed contrary to our public
policy with the result that courts refused to compel parties to perform
their promises to arbitrate. Jurists applied the axiom that such agree-
ments were unenforceable because they ousted the jurisdiction of the
courts, but historians have analyzed the real public policy to have been
the fear in the judicial ranks of losing the sine qua non of their
existence, that is, the settling of disputes between men. In maritime
jurisprudence, arbitration has swung the full pendulum, there being
evidence that as early as 1320 in England, maritime controversies were
settled by arbitration.3
The basis of jurisdiction for a court in arbitration controversies
is not the physical presence of the parties or res within the court's
geographic limits of power, but rather the expressed "consent" of the
parties by language in their arbitration agreement. Typical of the
agreements in the maritime area is the printed New York Produce
Exchange form charter-party, wherein the charterer and the vessel
owner agree:
Should any dispute arise between Owners and the charterers, the
matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons at New York.
The arbitrators shall be commercial men.
The objective of this article is to analyze the connotations in the phrase
"at New York." Since the subject matter of the New York Arbitration
Act is generally unlimited, and the federal act, though limited in its
scope, applies to "maritime transactions," both acts govern charter-
parties and other maritime matters although the rights, remedies, and
results may be different under each act.
The problems in any federal-state question are further compli-
cated by constitutional considerations as well as conflict of laws
questions vis-h.-vis procedural rights. This article will attempt to
sketch a few of these problems, namely:
* Of the New York Bar.
1 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7501-7514.
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
3 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 122, n.3 (1924). See also
Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 1942 Am. Mar.
Cas. 364 (2d Cir. 1942) for an interesting history of arbitration in admiralty.
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(1) Whether the historical concept of federal-state concurrent
jurisdiction extends to arbitration of maritime affairs;
(2) which system prevails when the state court is invoked, but
the controversy is removed to the federal courts, where
remand to the state court is attempted, and;
(3) whether the characterization of substantive or remedial to
the Federal Arbitration Act is the panacea to the problem.
FEDERAL-STATE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Shortly after the passage of the New York Arbitration Act in
1920, the familiar problem of a state court's concurrent jurisdiction
over in personam admiralty matters reared its head. In 1924, the land-
mark Red Cross Line4 controversy was brought to the Supreme Court.
The charter-party between the owners and charterers of the vessel
provided for arbitration "in New York." The New York Court of
Appeals held that the state court had no jurisdiction believing a charter-
party was exclusively within federal admiralty jurisdiction, on the
rationale of the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Southern Pacific v.
Jensen,' that the need for maritime uniformity overrode a state's
interests in maritime matters. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Su-
preme Court majority, reversed the New York Court of Appeals, hold-
ing that by reason of the "saving to suitors" clause and the "right to a
common law remedy" contained therein, 6 a state had concurrent in
personam jurisdiction over maritime causes of action including charter-
parties containing arbitration clauses. So long as a state does not
attempt to enforce the in rem remedy exclusively reserved to the
admiralty court,7 or to change the "substantive admiralty law," the
state is free to adopt such remedies as it sees fit.8
The opinion of the Court is not weakened by the argument that
the case was decided prior to the effective date of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act. The federal act had been introduced in Congress in
December of 1922,1 a fact presumptively known by the Court and
counsel. Admittedly, as late as 1939, the respected admiralty treatises 9
inferred that the maritime doctrine of uniformity and federal pre-
emption by Congressional act demanded the ousting of the state
4 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 418
(1924).
G 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The Court held that New York Workmen's Compensation
Act when applied to maritime harbor workers, violated the policy of maritime uniformity.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
7 See the Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
8 264 U.S. 109, 123 (1924).
9 Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 847, 854, n. 41 (1960).
10 See, e.g., Gustavus Robinson, Admiralty Law, 231-232 (1939).
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arbitration acts of maritime subject matters including arbitration
clauses in charter-parties.
More than a decade later, in 1953, a New York court, in granting
a motion to compel arbitration, rejected the argument that a charter-
party arbitration clause was a maritime contract exclusively within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, on the theory that the
basis of jurisdiction was the "consent" of the parties contained in the
agreement to arbitrate "in the City of New York."'
The state court's power of concurrent in personam jurisdiction
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1954,12 on the authority of Red
Cross Line, by a 7-2 decision holding that a California state court
could adjudge vessel partition proceedings since such an action was not
within that prohibited historical in rem sphere of exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction.
In the late fifties, the state courts continued to apply the "saving
to suitors" clause to justify their jurisdiction over maritime arbitrations
and refused to be ousted of their power. 3 Again, apparent approval
came in 1959 from the United States Supreme Court when, in Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Company,'1 4 it reviewed the juris-
dictional problems of federal admiralty vis-a-vis federal civil vis-a-vis
state courts, and reaffirmed the traditional maritime powers of the
original colonial state courts:
Thus, if one thing is clear it is that the source of law in saving-
clause actions cannot be described in absolute terms. Maritime law
is not a monistic system. The State and Federal Governments
jointly exert regulatory powers, as they have played joint roles in
the development of maritime law throughout our history.' 5
Adherents of federalism can find rejuvenation in the 1959 decision
of the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc.6 Admittedly, the case does not involve maritime law, but rather
an interstate commerce inland shipment wherein Judge Medina held
that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which makes arbitration
11 T. 3. Stevenson & Co. v. International Coal Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 904, 185 N.Y.S.2d
599, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 1056 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
12 Madruga v. California, 346 U.S. 556, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 405 (1954).
13 See, e.g., First National Oil Corp. v. Arrieta, 2 Misc. 2d 225, 151 N.Y.S.2d 309
(Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 590, 157 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1957), appeal dismissed,
2 N.Y.2d 992, 143 N.E.2d 341, 163 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1957); H. V. B. Smith v. Polar Cia
De Navigacion Ltda., 15 Misc. 2d 301, 181 N.Y.S.2d 368, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 2123 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
14 358 U.S. 354, 1959 Am.. Mar. Cas. 832 (1959).
15 358 U.S. at 374, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. at 847.
16 271 F.2d 402, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 287 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909
(1960), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
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agreements enforceable, was "a declaration of national law equally
applicable in state or federal courts," that the section "created national
substantive law clearly constitutional under the maritime and com-
merce powers of the Congress," and that "the body of law thus created
is substantive, not procedural in character. '17 (Emphasis added.) The
case is famous, or infamous depending on the advocate's viewpoint, and
will remain so for some time, since it never reached the Supreme Court
due to settlement by the parties.
The Red Cross line of authority has not been buried by the
Lawrence case, at least in admiralty. In April 1961, Red Cross again
was revisited by the United States Supreme Court in Kossick v. United
Fruit Co.,"8 where it was held that the New York statute of frauds was
inapplicable to a seaman's oral contract against a shipowner. It is
noteworthy that the Court returned to the basic federal-state problem
raised in its 1917 Jensen decision upon which the New York Court of
Appeals erroneously relied in Red Cross Line. The Court reaffirmed its
decision in Romero without discussing the Second Circuit's decision in
Lawrence. In commenting on the federal-state overlapping in maritime
matters, the Court said:
But the process is surely rather one of accommodation, entirely
familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal concern, or
a process somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws
situation where two sovereignties assert divergent interests in a
transaction as to which both have some concern. 19
Where are we today, regarding a state's "concurrent in personam juris-
diction" as to maritime matters including arbitration clauses in charter-
parties? The writer would suggest that the principles of concurrent
jurisdiction will be sustained and reconciled, case by case, until the
Supreme Court meets head-on the absolute federalism jurisprudence
found in the recent Second Circuit cases.
A recent unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court
in a labor case involving federal court pre-emption of labor litigation
under section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
concluded in favor of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction stating
that "in our judicial history ... exclusive federal court jurisdiction over
cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather than the
rule."" For authority, the Court cited an admiralty case, Garrett v.
17 Id. at 407, 409, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. at 293, 296.
18 365 U.S. 731, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 833 (1961).
19 Id. at 738, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. at 840.
20 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962). See also Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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Moore-McCormack Co.,21 and rejected the argument that the dual
jurisdictional system would lead to disharmony in formulating federal
common law.
In summary, so long as a state does not violate a party's rights
rooted in the substantive maritime law, the principle of concurrent in
personam jurisdiction by state courts will be and should be preserved.
Uniformity, including uniformity in maritime law as a goal for its own
sake, does not seem to be the end of our present Supreme Court; the
preservation of a state's rights appears to be the superior interest.
RiGHT TO REmOVE AGAINST RIGHT TO REMAND IN RELATION TO
"CONSENT" AS THE BASIS OF JURISDICTION
When parties subscribing to a printed form charter-party arbi-
tration agreement "in New York," or "at New York," or "in the City
of New York" are they consenting to arbitration in the United States
district courts under the Federal Arbitration Act, or the New York
state courts under the New York Arbitration Act?
When the problem has arisen in the New York courts, they have
held that the making of an arbitration agreement is deemed a consent
or implied submission of the parties to the jurisdiction of that state's
courts. 2 When the identical problem has been presented to the federal
courts, the same rationale of "consent" is used to justify the conclusion
that the United States district courts have jurisdiction and the federal
act is then applied. It is true the federal act was modeled after the
state act, but case law, statutory amendments, and procedure between
the two is markedly different.2
The problem, to which of the two court systems do the parties
21 317 U.S. 239 (1945), where the court held a seaman could sue in the state court
for damages under the Jones Act, as well as for maintenance and cure.
22 Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931) (non-maritime); Matter
of Gantt, 297 N.Y. 433, 79 N.E.2d 815 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948) (non-
maritime); T. J. Stevenson v. International Coal Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 904, 185 N.Y.S.2d
599, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 1056 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Terminal Auxiliar Maritima SA. v.
Cocotos Steamship Co., 11 Misc. 2d 697, 178 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 2122
(Sup. Ct. 1957); H. V. B. Smith v. Polar Cia De Navigacion Ltda., 15 Misc. 2d 301,
181 N.Y.S.2d 368, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 2123 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
23 Farr & Co. v. Cia Intercontinental De Navigation De Cuba, S.,, 144 F. Supp.
839, 1956 Am. Mar. Cas. 1701 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d. 342, 1957 Am. Mar.
Cas. 450 (2d Cir. 1957). Note that in affirming the Second Circuit refers to the second
landmark New York case of Gilbert v. Burnstine, supra note 22, but adds it is "not
controlling on us." 243 F.2d at 346, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas. at 455, accord, Orion Shipping
Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum, 284 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1960).
24 E.g., compare the time limitations in demanding arbitration contained in the
New York Act, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7502(b), with the lack of any time bar section
in the federal Act.
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"consent," must be faced in a removal-remand situation, that is, where
A invokes the aid of the state court in the arbitration, but B
removes the action to the federal court. The removal takes effect
immediately upon filing the petition of removal, which is usually prior
to the hearing in the state court. Finally A requests the federal court
to remand to the state court. Sometimes the problem is judicially
sidestepped by a valid technique, other times, the judicial "tool" em-
ployed is questionable.
Compare the results of the concurrent jurisdiction controversy
arising from varying interpretations of maritime arbitration clauses in
Omnium Freighting Corp. v. United Steamship Corp.,25 where the
federal district judge consented to the state court's hearing of the
motion to vacate, with Amicizia Societanave Gazione v. Chilean Nitrate
Corp.Y where the respondent acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the
federal court, ending the concurrent jurisdiction controversy before it
started.
In contrast is a recent case where the federal trial judge decided
the issue "since it may be assumed that the state court will recognize
the priority of this application" to the federal court.27  (Emphasis
added.) Since in all three cases, the state court was the first court to
be invoked by a party, and since the parties arguably "consented" to
the jurisdiction of either court, is it not questionable logic to reach a
decision by the characterization of "assuming" recognition of federal
"priority"?28 A subsequent Southern District of New York decision
questions the conclusion that federal priority is proper in this context,
and concludes by stating that any priority "should be accorded to the
court whose jurisdiction was so initially invoked. 2 9 Are arbitration
clauses in maritime contracts returning us to the "forum-shopping"
intended to be stopped by the United States Supreme Court in Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins?0 Perhaps the future may be worse. In the same
25 15 Misc. 2d 800, 185 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
20 184 F. Supp. 116, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas., 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d
805 (2d Cir. 1960).
27 flios Shipping & Trading Corporation v. American Anthracite & Bituminous
Coal Corporation, 148 F. Supp. 698, 699, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas. 1294, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd per curiarn, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957).
28 Healy refers to the situation as a jurisdictional "race" between the parties.
Healy, "Admiralty and Shipping," 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 587, 592 (1960).
29 Cocotos Steamship v. Hugo Neu Corp., 178 F. Supp. 491, 493, 1959 Am. Mar.
Cas. 1941, 1943 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); accord, Petroleum Cargo Carriers, Ltd. v. Unitas, Inc.,
31 Misc. 2d 222, 220 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd nem., 15 App. Div. 2d 735,
224 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1962).
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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federal court, counsel may be "shopping" for the right judge to hear
his case.
The confusion in federal-state overlapping jurisdiction and re-
moval-remand problems has swelled since the 1948 revision of the
Federal Judicial Code, including the removal statute. Section 1333 (1)"'
saves to maritime suitors their right to a common-law remedy in a
state court; sections 1441(b) 2 and 133283 declare that, generally,
actions are not removable to a federal court unless there is diversity of
citizenship. These sections form the basis for state court jurisdiction
and the granting in federal courts of motions to remand to the state
court. On the opposite side, section 1441 (a) 34 gives to litigants the
power of removal to the federal courts in cases where the district courts
have original jurisdiction, pursuant to the United States Constitution."
Other sections give removal power and federal jurisdiction without
diversity to claims "arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of
the United States. 13 6 Section 1331 (a) 37 does the same where the matter
exceeds $10,000. These are the sections forming the basis for exclusive
federal court jurisdiction and refusal to remand actions to the state
court.
The language of statutory jurisdictional sections of such obvious
complexity can be, and has been, stretched or contracted, depending
upon the jurisprudential feelings of the deciding court. Which of the
three, diversity, amount, or subject matter, must a maritime arbitration
dispute have in order to confine it to either the federal or state
judiciary system?
The adherents of broad federal jurisdiction over maritime matters
received a boost by the eminent Judge Magruder's opinion in Doucette
v. Vinson,8" where he refused to remand, and held that a general
maritime law claim (fisherman's injury) could be maintained in the
federal courts, on the theory that it arises under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, even where there was no diversity of
citizenship.
Thereafter, sympathetic jurists had little hesitation in denying
maritime suitors their alleged state court rights, holding that the right
31 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
34 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
35 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2: "The judicial power [of United States Courts] shall
extend to all cases ... of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
36 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
37 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
88 194 F.2d 834, 1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 458 (1st Cir. 1952).
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to remove was superior to the "saving to suitors" right, which could be
constitutionally satisfied in the federal court on the civil side, since the
clause merely gave a choice of remedies, not of forums. 9
Further support in favor of broad federal jurisdictional maritime
powers was found in the United States Supreme Court's language in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, to the effect that "while states may
sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state may not
deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined in
controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this
Court." 40 (Emphasis added.)
The proponents of narrow federal jurisdiction over maritime
matters, who are in favor of preservation of state court rights by virtue
of the "saving to suitors" clause, received a similar boost by Justice
Medina's opinion in Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha.14
It was held that general maritime law causes of action could not be
brought on the federal law or civil side unless there was diversity and
the requisite jurisdictional amount. This school of thought could not
be deemed a minority as it had many followers, so that it is most
difficult to reconcile decisions in the same district court.42 Can the
cases be reconciled, or is there actually a different jurisprudential
approach underlying each jurist's decision? The state court adherents
demand diversity and over $10,000, and maybe more, to oust them of
jurisdiction. They urge that every doubt should be resolved in favor of
30 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Bryant, 107 F. Supp. 704, 1953 Am. Mar. Cas. 348 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952); Wunderlich v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 877, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas.
1659 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (marine insurance); Bakhshandeh v. Continental Ins. Co., 129
F. Supp. 122, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (marine insurance); Ilios v.
American Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas.
1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (arbitration); Compania Maritima Ador v. New Hampshire Fire
Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 577, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (marine insur-
ance); Crispin Co. v. Lykes Steamship Co., 134 F. Supp. 704, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 2050
(S.D. Tex. 1955) (cargo suit); Davis v. Matson, 143 F. Supp. 537, 1956 Am. Mar. Cas.
2146 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (longshoreman's injury).
40 346 U.S. 406, 409, 1954 Am. Mar. Cas. 1, 7 (1953).
41 221 F.2d 615, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 1483 (2d Cir. 1955); accord, Jordine v. Wal-
ling, 185 F.2d 662, 1951 Am. Mar. Cas. 43 (3d Cir. 1951); Jenkins v. Roderick, 156
F. Supp. 299, 1957 Am. Mar. Cas. 2325 (D. Mass. 1957).
42 Compare the previous S.D.N.Y. decisions, supra note 39, with Judge Cashin's
opinions in Cocotos v. Hugo Neu Corp., 178 F. Supp. 491, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 1941
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (arbitration), and Amicizia Societanave Gazione v. Chilean Nitrate
Corp., 184 F. Supp. 116, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 805
(2d Cir. 1960) (arbitration); see Vistorias Milling Co. v. Hugo Neu Corp., 196 F. Supp.
64, 1961 Am. Mar. Cas. 2369 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (arbitration); Rosenthal & Block China
Corp. v. Porzellanfabrik, 183 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (arbitration); Harrisville
v. Home Ins. Co., 129 F. Supp. 300, 1955 Am. Mar. Cas. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (marine
insurance).
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remand, that the purpose of the amendment to section 1441 (a) 43 was
to limit removal from the state courts, and that to hold in favor of
federal civil courts is tantamount to reading out of the statute books
the "saving to suitors" clause.44
The conservative jurists who advocate the preservation of a state's
power and jurisdiction under the "saving to suitors" clause won the
first round when the United States Supreme Court, in Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co.,45 resurrected and favorably reviewed
the maritime "suitors" clause, criticizing Justice Magruder's 1952
Doucette46 opinion as upsetting the century-old "lucid principle of
constitutional construction" that a maritime controversy was not a
"claim arising under the Constitution ... or laws of the United States"
under § 1441(b). 4 7
In view of the axiom that all cases are distinguishable on their
facts, plus the unpredictability of tomorrow's law when its basis is
today's 5-4 decision by the United States Supreme Court, it is not
surprising that lower federal courts do not always follow the principles
laid down by the highest Court's most recent opinion.48
Returning to the basic question, are all the cases on maritime
jurisdiction in the removal-remand area sufficiently reconcilable to
conclude what the rule is regarding maritime arbitration? It is sug-
gested the cases can be successfully synthesized, at least to the extent
that where there is diversity of citizenship and over $10,000 in contro-
versy under a charter-party arbitration clause, the federal court may
refuse to remand to the state court, depending on the judicial phi-
losophy of the judge deciding. When one of the three elements
(diversity, amount or subject matter) is missing, the federal court's
refusal to remand may be appealable on the grounds that it is violative
of the constitutional right under the "saving to suitors" clause.
But it is also suggested that the analytical method presently
43 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
44 See Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
45 358 U.S. 354, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 832 (1959) was a 5-4 decision where a Spanish
seaman injured aboard a Spanish registered vessel filed his combination Jones act, un-
seaworthiness, maintenance and cure cause of action on the federal law side to get a
jury hearing on his general maritime law cause of action. His unsuccessful theory was
that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("arises under the Constitution") did not require diversity of
citizenship (both parties were foreigners).
46 Doucette v. Vinson, 194 F.2d 834, 1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 458 (1st Cir. 1952).
47 358 U.S. at 365, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. at 840.
48 See, e.g., Di Benedetto v. Moller Steamship Co., 186 F. Supp. 228, 1960 Am. Mar.
Cas. 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), where the court refused to remand to the state court and
narrowly distinguished Romero, on the ground that there was no question of remand
in that case.
[Vol. 24
ARBITRATION IN ADMIRALTY
employed is inappropriate in view of the context, that is, that the basis
of jurisdiction here is "consent," and cases should be decided on that
rationale rather than the technical language of the Federal Judicial
Code. By consensual agreement, the parties have implicitly submitted
to both the federal and state court systems and both arbitration acts,
therefore, the first court invoked by either party should be deferred
to by all subsequent state and federal courts, regardless of diversity or
jurisdictional amount. Deciding the situs and forum of these cases on
characterizations of diversity and federal "priority" appears to be
contra to the jurisdictional basis of "consent."
IS THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT IN MARITIME ARBITRATIONS
SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL?
There is little doubt that the Second Circuit could not have used
stronger language in Lawrence, when it stated that section 249 of the
Federal Arbitration Act was "national" law, was "national substantive
law, clearly constitutional under the maritime and commerce powers
of the Congress," and was "substantive, not procedural, in character." 50
But, whether the same label of "substantive" would or should be
applied by the Second Circuit or the United States Supreme Court to a
maritime arbitration clause, it is not conclusively decided by Lawrence,
as there, the Second Circuit was interpreting a commerce contract
involving an inland interstate shipment of goods and did not have all
the maritime law considerations and precedents before it.
The characterization of "substantive" to section 2 of the federal
act might not apply in maritime arbitrations for the following reasons.
First, it must be noted that the Lawrence case was not decided by the
Supreme Court, since the controversy was settled by the parties after
certiorari had been granted. Therefore, it is not yet known whether the
highest Court will concur in Judge Medina's reconciling and distin-
guishing of the Supreme Court's prior decision in Bernhardt v. Polyo-
graphic Co. of America,5 especially in view of the express admission
49 9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . ..."
50 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407, 409, 1960
Am. Mar. Cas. 287, 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, appeal dis-
missed per stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
51 350 U.S. 198 (1956), was a non-maritime (employment contract) arbitration
controversy, the enforceability of which the Court held was to be interpreted not by
the Federal Arbitration Act case law, nor by Vermont local law (which held arbitration
unenforceable), but, rather, by the United States district court determining the Vermont
conflicts of law rule which might apply New York law and enforce the arbitration
agreement.
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that the Second Circuit was "reluctant to disagree" 2 with Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Bernhardt.
In Bernhardt, Justice Frankfurter characterized the federal act
as "remedial and procedural" when he stated it was "not applicable to
diversity cases."5 By holding that state law governs in arbitration
enforceability cases where there is diversity of citizenship, Justice
Frankfurter relied on the constitutional analysis of the Court in
Erie, that in federal-state conflict of law cases, if the conflict can be
characterized as significantly affecting the result of the litigation, then
state law determines the outcome of the controversy, apd the appli-
cation of state law is a constitutional right. Such analysis clearly is
founded on the premise that the federal arbitration act is remedial
and procedural, since, as Lawrence contends, if there were a federal
substantive right to arbitration, the doctrine of Erie would be irrelevant
even in diversity cases. 54
The combination of Bernhardt and Erie, plus some legislative
history,55 makes it uncertain whether the Lawrence opinion would have
been affirmed by the highest Court.
The second argument against characterizing the Federal Arbi-
tration Act as "substantive" law in maritime arbitrations is the his-
torical maritime precedents which were not before the Lawrence court.
The constitutionality of the arbitration act was upheld in Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus,56 over the strenuous argument that admiralty
courts did not have the power to order specific performance in any
situation, including an agreement to arbitrate. Chief Justice Hughes
upheld the constitutionality of the 1925 act on the ground that this
was merely an equity power, purely remedial in nature. The Court's
emphasis on "remedy" cannot be overlooked:
The question, then, is one merely as to the power of Congress to
afford a remedy in admiralty to enforce such an obligation ...
The general power of the Congress to provide remedies in matters
falling within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and
and to regulate their procedure, is indisputable.57 (Emphasis added.)
52 271 F.2d at 404, 1960 Am. Mar. Cas. at 289.
53 350 U.S. at 208.
54 See Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 847 (1960) and Note, 45 Cornell L.Q. 795 (1960)
for two noteworthy articles on arbitration and Lawrence vis-&-vis Bernhardt and Erie.
The Yale article suggests a unique characterization, that is, that the federal Act created
"a right to a remedy as well as the remedy itself." Supra at 856.
55 See H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th. Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924), wherein it is stated:
"Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of pro-
cedure. . . .The remedy . . . is founded upon the Federal control over interstate com-
merce and over admiralty."
56 284 U.S. 263, 1932 Am. Mar. Cas. 161 (1932).
57 Id. at 277, 1932 Am. Mar. Cas. at 167.
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If the unanimous 1932 decision in Dreyfus is still the maritime law
today, it is difficult to see how the federal arbitration act can be
labelled as "substantive" without shaking its constitutional maritime
foundation that it is merely a remedy. No matter what new law
Lawrence might have made in non-maritime arbitration, there appears
to be another bridge yet to be crossed before the same characterization
can be applied regarding maritime arbitrations.
The third argument to be considered in whether the federal act
creates a federal right in maritime arbitrations is the maritime case law
of the United States Supreme Court, prior to and subsequent to
Dreyfus. The basic case, Red Cross Line,5 decided after the federal
act was brought before Congress (1922), but before its passage (1925),
held that arbitration is a "remedy"; it has been recited with approval
in Madruga,50 in Romero,60 and in Kossick,1 which was subsequent
to the Lawrence opinion. These Supreme Court decisions make it even
more difficult to conclude that the Lawrence characterization of "sub-
stantive" applies to maritime as well as non-maritime arbitrations.
Finally, the non-maritime arbitration cases, subsequent to Law-
rence, disclose that the label "substantive" is not the panacea for the
federal-state conflicts problem in this area. Chief Judge Lumbard's
concurring opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal
Const. Co.62 stated that if the federal act is inapplicable, the federal
court will look sometimes at the New York conflicts of law rule, to find
the applicable law governing an arbitration clause in a contract, and
other times at the New York local law, since the New York Arbitration
Act is substantive in part and remedial in other parts. 3 How many
lawyers and businessmen can follow the "leapfrog" process apparently
required in this area, and how does such an analysis aid predictability
of tomorrow's law are two of the questions that must be considered in
judging the merits of the "substantive-procedural" analysis.
The recent Second Circuit case of Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Refining Co., 4 demonstrates almost three years of "forum shop-
ping" by opposing counsel in controverting an arbitration clause which
provided that arbitration was to be held in New York in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The parties
58 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
59 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954).
60 358 U.S. 354, 372 (1959).
61 365 U.S. 731, 740 (1961).
62 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961), where a motion to compel arbitration under the
federal Act was granted against the defense of no jurisdiction due to lack of diversity.
63 Id. at 388, n.3.
64 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961) ; see n.5 at 87 where the court reserves for the future
the fixdng of the borderline in arbitration between substantive and procedural.
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jumped from the district court in Puerto Rico to the New York state
supreme court to the Southern District of New York, back to Puerto
Rico, up to the First Circuit, which applied New York law, down to
the Southern District, for two decisions by different judges, and, finally,
to the Second Circuit, which granted a petition for mandamus against
one of the district judges. It must be noted that over thirty months
expired in motion practice before the parties were finally ordered to
arbitrate the merits of the controversy. This extensive litigation
resulted from an attempt to determine whether maritime arbitration
is substantive, or remedial and procedural, along with the problem of
reconciling Bernhardt and Lawrence.
It appears that the "substantive-procedural" characterization laid
down by the Second Circuit in Lummus will require frequent revisiting
by appellate courts until the line of demarcation is clearly established,
if it ever can be clearly established. Whether or not the substantive
characterization can constitutionally be applied in maritime arbitra-
tions has not been faced to date by the Second Circuit, or any other
court.
CONCLUSION
The inconsistency and inconclusiveness of the case law prevents a
clear conclusion of what the law is today in this area of federal-state
concurrent jurisdiction over maritime and non-maritime arbitrations.
What the law ought to be is easier to conclude than what the law is.
The law, at least, should be clear and somewhat predictable. If the
Federal Arbitration Act was, and is, intended to pre-empt the field of
maritime arbitrations, and maybe it should pre-empt the field for
purposes of uniformity, then Congress or the United States Supreme
Court should decree such pre-exemption. If state's rights, by virtue of
the "saving to suitors" clause, is deemed by Congress or the highest
Court to be the superior consideration, then this should also be clearly
decreed and thereafter followed by the lower federal tribunals and state
courts. Under the present system, diversity of citizenship and other
technicalities result in diverse decisions based on diversity of juris-
prudence of the deciding courts. It would seem the primary rationale
should be the "consent" to arbitration by the parties, as found in the
contractual clause.
It is suggested that the following approach, by Justice Coleman
of the City Court in New York County, reaches the desired result from
an easily comprehensible analysis. The language in the maritime arbi-
tration clause provided for arbitration "in New York." One party ar-
gued the federal act should apply, and his opponent argued the state
act should govern. Deciding in favor of the federal act, Justice Coleman
said:
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Whether the parties, in agreeing to arbitrate, subjected themselves
to the provisions of the federal statute, or to those of the New York
statute, is a question of intention, to be determined in the light of
context and occasion.
By the test of intention we must say the federal statute applies....
Normally he would think of a federal court, and more specifically,
of a court of admiralty as the one in which his matters in litigation
would be disposed of; to him, a federal court would be "forum
conveniens." The cause of action itself is normally one that, in
the Port of New York at least, finds its way into a federal court....
The environment in which the parties to the arbitration, their
attorneys, and the arbitrator moved was "federal." 6 5
A conclusion in the area of suggested re-drafting techniques to avoid
these problems might also be helpful. Parties desiring to arbitrate their
future disputes should scrutinize the language used in printed forms.
If the ambiguous phrase, "in New York," is used by the form, amend-
ments should be added to clarify the parties' intentions. Such amend-
ments should spell out whether the federal or state arbitration act
should govern the relationship; whether the federal court or the state
court should be the forum for resolving any dispute before or after the
arbitration award is rendered; and whether federal maritime law or
state law should be determinative of the dispute.
Rather than hinder the business contract of the parties by forcing
them to discuss the alternatives of handling future disputes, which is
undoubtedly an unpleasant topic, it is suggested the amendments should
be incorporated by the drafters of the printed forms.
As a final note, until legislative, judicial, or drafting clarifications
are effected, it is recommended that counsel preparing their client's
case for the arbitrators' hearing should stipulate prior to the hearing
the governing arbitration act, the forum, and the law, thereby mini-
mizing the time and expense often incurred subsequently in attempting
to upset the award made by the arbitrators.
65 French v. Petrinovic, 183 Misc. 27, 29, 30, 46 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848, 849 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1946), aff'd, 184 Misc. 406, 54 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946) where the arbitrator,
as plaintiff, sued a shipowner for his unpaid services rendered as an arbitrator.
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